Japanese strategic planning for the Pacific (1905-1940)
From Freepedia
Japan's victories and defeats in the Second World War can be traced back to pre-war planning and lessons learned from previous conflicts. Victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were against numerically or technologically superior foes.
Despite a militaristic culture and aggressive leaders, Japan was not ready to fight a modern war against Western powers. Heavy tanks and artillery were lacking. Japanese training stressed a strong esprit de corps, rather than mechanized fighting forces, unlike most European powers.
Contents |
Analysis in depth of Japanese strategies to conquer southern areas
Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ, the General Staff), with its background of insistence on the prerogative of supreme command, had a strong basis for pre-eminence. Within IGHQ itself, General Sugiyama, the Army Chief of Staff, was practically a "robot"; real power lay with the First Bureau (Operations). This Bureau, with its own dictum concerning the "secrecy of supreme command," adopted ultra-secret policies and acted as a law unto itself, with utter self-satisfaction. The common opinion of those who served on the IGHQ staff when the Pacific War broke out is that the hostilities stemmed from advocacy by the First Bureau.
At the War Ministry, on the other hand, it was the Bureau of Military Affairs which played the most active role. The Ministry was engaged in matters related to actualities of planning, and was more concrete and practical. In the bureaux concerned with materiel and armament an atmosphere of special anxiety prevailed concerning initiation of hostilities.
Tojo, the Minister of War, tried to maintain control over the Army. In this respect, he had the reputation as the most able War Minister, with the best results, since the Manchurian Incident in 1931.
Before the Pacific War, the quarrels between cliques (the Kodoha and the Tosei-he) were replaced by a new tendency which attracted remarkable attention: friendships among classmates of the Military Academy had an impact on official business. The views of Prime Minister Konoye and of Tojo clashed head-on. Konoye was planning to bring talks with the United States to a successful close, by agreeing to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. Tojo strongly opposed it.
After the formation of his new government, Tojo ordered the Cabinet Planning Board to re-examine the question of the possible effects upon national power if the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands were to cut off their trade with Japan. Tojo asked the Board to start from scratch and especially to ascertain the possibilities of Japan's avoidance of a crisis by stepping up the development of the synthetic petroleum industry. Suzuki, the Chief of the Cabinet Planning Board, reported that the whole problem of synthetic fuel had been examined, and that it was assumed that 5,200,000 tons of petroleum would be required annually. Tojo was told that rapid achievement of self-sufficiency could not be expected. Even if intensive efforts were made, it would still take at least seven years before the desired results could be obtained.
Toward the winter of 1940, the Army High Command asked the War Ministry's Economic Mobilization Bureauto investigate and predict possibledevelopments in the power position of Japan. Two hypothetical assumptions were postulated: (A) Japan launches a war against the United States and Great Britain in the spring of 1941; or (B) Japan completely avoids hostilities. The major conclusions are summarized as follows:
Assumption A. There is hope of making up shortages of iron ore and light metals in the future, if shipping losses are not severe. Rare and non-ferrous metals, however, would become drastically insufficient in the third year after the commencement of war, because further acquisitions would be unpromising. Liquid fuel would also end up in the same critical status. If, on the other hand, shipping losses proved great, there was a strong possibility that entire industries would be paralyzed because of diminution in the transportation of coal supplies.
Assumption B. If the United States and Great Britain enforced a cutoff in economic relations, Japan's natural resources would be remarkably diminished. The shortage of liquid fuel, in particular, would deal a fatal blow to the nation.
Afterwards, when U.S.-Japanese relations were becoming serious as a consequence of the Japanese Army's entry into South French Indo-China (July 1941), the Army High Command again turned to the Economic Mobilization Bureau of the War Ministry. Posing a hypothetical date of November 1 for the eventuality of hostilities against America and England, the Army asked the Bureau to re-examine the national power position. The conclusion was forthcoming: Under the circumstances, the future held no hope for Japan, even if she waited with prudence and circumspection. Implicit confidence could not be placed in the economic and industrial situation of Japan beyond two years after the commencement of hostilities, even if Japan resolved to initiate matters herself.
Fuel stocks in 1941
Type of Supplies* China Theater
Liquid Fuel Requirements*
Airplane Gasoline 117 15 Standard Gasoline 83 8 Kerosene 32 1 Light Oil 32 0.4 Heavy Oil 443 105 Machine Oil 36 15
- In units of 10,000 kiloliters.
of liquid fuel toward the spring of 1941, and the quantities required annually during the China Incident. All figures are approximate.
If, despite a rupture in economic relations with the United States and England, Japan were to carry on with the China Incident, her stores of liquid fuel would drop in two years to 800,000 kiloliters of aviation fuel and 2,300,000 kiloliters of heavy oil. And if, with her remaining stocks of fuel, Japan launched into intensive warfare, her Army and Navy could only hope to wage aerial operations for about a year. At sea, she could only fight decisive battle operations for about half a year.
This outlook underlay the military leaders' advocacy of the view characterized as Japan's "gradual decline." It is well-known that this view became a justification used by those who proposed-launching war.The number of Japanese Army ground divisions increased annuallas follows (figures as of end of year in each case):
1937 - 24 divisions
1938 - 34
1939 - 39
1940 - 50
1941 - 51
From about 1937, Japanese tank units began to be stepped up; a Mechanized Headquarters was finally established in April 1941. Meanwhile, in the light of the experience gained at Nomonhan, there was some sentiment to the effect that the first objective of the armored unit consolidation program should be ten completely equipped tank divisions. In fact, however, no armored divisions had been activated by the time the Pacific War broke out.
In 1937 the Army had drawn up a plan to reinforce Air Force strength from 54 to 142 squadrons, in one fell swoop between 1938 and 1942. The plan was changed in 1939, with an envisaged increase to 162 squadrons by the end of 1943. The annual number of Air Force squadrons was in reality increased as follows (data as of end of year in each instance):
1938 - 70 squadrons
1939 - 94
1940 - 116
1941 - 133
In connection with military armaments, the Army was troubled about the expansion of war industrial potential. The War Ministry, in the spring of 1937, had already drafted Five-Year Plans to enlarge the munitions industry and other important industrial spheres of the economy. The Ministry did its best to accomplish the goals which were set. With the advent of the China Incident, things had turned out so well that, toward the end of 1940, levels of production were reached that were sufficient to meet the full requirements of the China Theater plus the extra power needed to arm against the Soviet Union. Stocks of shells, in particular, were greatly increased. Just before the commencement of the Pacific War, Japan had developed a productive capacity which enabled ther manufacture about 3,500 military aircraft and 1,200 tanks per year.
From the end of 1940 until June 1941, Lieutenant General Yamashita's military inspection team was visiting Germany and Italy. The gist of the General's report follows:
(1)Military materiel programs should stress air power and mechanization for the Army. Air strength must be especially built up, on a priority basis-qualitatively and quantitatively.
(2)Emphasis in ground armaments should be accorded speed and armor, built around a nucleus of medium tanks. In the case of other combat arms,mechanization and advanced technology must also be exploited to the fullest.
(3)Paratroop units should be organized as soon as possible, and practical applications must be examined.
(4) In view of the out-of-date equipment of the Japanese Army, it is
concluded that the last thing Japan should contemplate is the initiation of war against either the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union.Japan should accordingly exercise patience in avoiding the outbreak of war, meanwhile concentrating all of her strength upon the modernization of her military materiel.
In accordance with the Yamashita Report, the military authorities decided to lay greater strength upon air power thereafter. Steps were taken to beef up potentials, to organize paratroop forces, and to study methods of employment. Contrary to the conclusions reached by the Yamashita mission, however, the measures introduced turned out to be preliminary preparations, useful in case a war with America broke out.
If, on the other hand, ground operations are to be launched far across the seas, it is imperative to organize special units, abundantly endowed with fire power and mobility, but able to operate with minimal supply requirements. Foreign colonial powers had such units, but the Japanese Army did not, and had not yet studied the matter. With the deterioration of the situation in the southern regions, however, Japan undertook a hasty and temporary reorganization of her cold-weather troops, and dispatched them to tropical littorals. Perhaps it was all unavoidable, but because the wrong measures were undertaken at the time, units sent far overseas were blamed for their poor performance after the Pacific War
THE Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, decided that Japan should prepare for war, with the target date for readiness set for the end of October. It was inflexibly resolved not to refrain from hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in order that the very existence and self-defense of the Empire might be ensured. IGHQ thereupon set about preparing for the southern operations in real earnest. Major topics for consideration included: (1) re-examination of existing operational plans; (2) adaptation of forces for operations; (3) redeployment of troops, in accordance with preceding items; (4) establishment of new or supplementary air and sea transportation facilities; (5) preparation of military supplies and equipment; (6) commandeering of ships, and modification of holds to accommodate a greater number of men and horses.
Most of the projected preparations were finished by the end of October.
Promulgated by the Emperor in times of war or of emergency, orders of battle indicated operational command components. On November 6, 1941, IGHQ issued the order of battle of the Southern Army, as shown in Table 3 on the next page.
After World War I, peacetime operational planning against the United States became less and less abstract as the years went by. The plans, in substance, centered upon the conquest of the Philippines after a force of about three divisions had made landings at Lingayen, Batangas,and Lamon bays.
Peacetime operational plans against Great Britain, drawn up in 1939, were designed to deprive the English of their footholds in the Far East by reducing Hong Kong and Singapore.
These plans were somewhat revised afterwards, but it was not until 1941 that a coordinated plan of operations vs. the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands was first established.
From an examination of the plans for 1941, IGHQ drew up new operational objectives for the Pacific War, which may be summarized as follows:
ORDER OF BATTLE, SOUTHERN ARMY, NOVEMBER 1941
Unit Commanding General Core Southern Army Gen Hisaichi Terauchi Fourteenth Army LtGen Masaharu Homma 16th, 48th Infantry Di-
visions; 65th Independ-
ent Mixed Brigade
Fifteenth Army LtGen Shojiro Iida 33d, 55th (-) Divisions Sixteenth Army LtGen Hitoshi Imamura 2d Division; 56th Inde-
pendent Mixed Brigade
Twenty-Fifth Army LtGen Tomoyuki Imperial Guard Divi-
Yamashita sion; 5th, 18th Divi-
sions
21st Division LtGen Hisaichi Tanaka [Directly attached to
Army; from North China]
3d Air Group LtGen Michio Sugawara Four fighter regiments;
three light bomber reg-
iments; three heavy
bomber regiments; one
reconnaissance regiment
5th Air Group LtGen Eiryo Obata Two fighter regiments;
three light bomber reg-
iments; two heavy
bomber regiments;
[and one reconnais-
sance regiment]
Miscellaneous [Directly attached to
Army: 21st Independent
Mixed Brigade; 21st
Independent Air Unit;
4th Independent Mixed
Brigade]
I.Operations in South Sea Regions
A.Objectives
First reduce the main Far Eastern bases of the Americans, the British, and then the Dutch. Occupy strategically important areas in the southern regions. The Army intends to occupy the following regions:
The Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, the Celebes, Borneo, the Bismarck Islands, Dutch Timor, etc.
B.Policy
The Army and the Navy will operate in close conjunction, launching operations against the Philippines and British Malaya simultaneously. Objectives will be secured as soon as possible.
C.Essentials of Operational Guide
1.Operations will commence with air raids against the Philippines and landings in British Malaya. Exploiting the effects of air operations, the main Army forces will soon afterwards make landings-first in the Philippines and then in Malaya. Both areas will be seized as soon as possible. In addition, at the outset of operations, such important points as Guam, Hong Kong, and British Borneo will be occupied. Stability will be maintained in both Thailand and Indo-China.
During this period of operations, important areas such as the Bismarcks, Dutch Borneo, and the Celebes must be captured as soon as possible. With the unfurling of the Malay operation, key objectives in southern Sumatra must be occupied, and preparations should be made for action in Java; while vital areas rich in natural resources should also be secured. The Moluccas and Timor must be seized.
2.With the establishment of air bases required for operations against Java, and the achievement of aerial mastery over the Dutch Air Force, Java will be captured. After Singapore has been taken, northern Sumatra must be seized, when the situation presents itself.
3.During the course of the above-mentioned operations, even if the Japanese Combined Fleet is compelled to effect interceptive countermeasures in response to the movements of the main U. S. Fleet, or if the Soviet Army enters the war, Japan must at least carry out the operations planned against both the Philippines and Malaya, endeavoring to secure the desired objectives as soon as possible.
4.The Army will meanwhile seize air bases in southern Burma, taking advantages of opportunities as they arise. If the situation thereafter warrants, the Army will launch operations to control Burma.
D.Forces Employed
Basic strength will consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 air groups, and units under direct control of the Southern Army. Of the eleven cited divisions, nine belong to the Southern Army; one, to the Twenty-Third Army; while the 56th Division (in Kyushu) has been assigned to the order of battle of the Southern Army on November 27.
- Distribution of forces and zones of action follow:
1. Southern Army:
- Fourteenth Army: Philippines operational area
- Fifteenth Army: Thailand and Burma
- Sixteenth Army: Netherlands East Indies
- Twenty-Fifth Army: Malaya
Forces under direct control of the Southern Army include the 21st Division, 21st Independent Mixed Brigade, 3d and 5th Air Groups.
2.Hong Kong area operations will be undertaken by forces built around one division of the Twenty-Third Army (under command of the China Expeditionary Army).
3.The South Seas Detachment, built around three infantry battalions, and under the direct control of IGHQ, will handle operations against Guam and the Bismarcks. (N.B.: A Detachment is a force which is temporarily assigned for independent action and has a special mission.)
E.Commencement of Operations
X-Day is to be made known separately. If the negotiations between Japan and the United States are successfully concluded before the initiation of hostilities, however, the subject operations are to be cancelled.
F.Essentials of Hong Kong Operations
Upon learning of landings or air raids executed by the expeditionary forces attacking Malaya, one body of the Twenty-Third Army and the main force of the 2d China Expeditionary Fleet will capture Hong Kong. The Army force is afterwards expected to be diverted to operations against the Dutch East Indies.
G.Essentials of Operations vs. Guam and Bismarcks
The South Seas Detachment and the main elements of the 4th Fleet will first capture Guam. After Rabaul has been seized, the South Seas Detachment will secure the air bases there, and then shift its efforts toward the vicinity of Palau.
H.Air Operations
1.Operational Policies
The air arms of the Army and the Navy will work closely together, carrying out air attacks against American, British, and Dutch air bases from the very commencement of hostilities. The air forces will obtain control of the air, co-operate with amphibious operations, and later support ground actions.
2.Essentials of Guide
a.It is planned that the Malay region will have priority in Army air operations.
b.With the progress of the ground operations, air bases from southern Formosa will be moved forward to the Philippines; those in South French Indo-China will deploy to Malaya.
c.Offensive aerial operations, directed overseas, should be launched at dawn [on X-Day], with sudden strikes at major Allied air bases, to crush their power in one fell swoop.
d.The Army air forces will have primary responsibility for covering landing craft.
I.Supplies and Equipment
1.The main logistical base for the southern operations will be French Indo-China. Formosa serves as an intermediate relay base, while the Canton area is an ancillary relay facility.
2.Units in Manchuria will be diverted for supply use in the southern operations; those in China be reserved for future employment.
3.Quantities of materiel required by the Southern Army to wage one engagement [a logistical factor of three months' duration] will be transported together with or just after the actual landing operation shipments.
4.In the southern regions, the Army will seek to exploit natural resources for their war potential. In China, a program of complete local self-sufficiency and support will be particularly intensified.
II.Operations in China after Southern Campaign Gets Underway
The present strategy will be maintained in general. With Navy support, the Japanese Army will extirpate American and British influence in China, and will hasten the surrender of the Chiang regime, by exerting greater pressure upon Chungking and by executing statecraft at the same time.
If,after the southern operations are underway, the Soviet Army appears to be mounting an invasion of Manchuria, requisite forces will be diverted there in ample time.
III.Defensive Measures vs. U.S.S.R. after Southern Operations Get Underway
While continuing the present policies of taking strict precautions and strengthening defensive posture vs. the Soviet Union, Japan will do her best to prevent war [with Russia]. In the event that the United States and the U.S.S.R. in concert-or the Soviets alone-challenge Japan to war, the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces will be knocked out as soon as possible. Required forces will be dispatched from both China and the Japanese homeland, without losing the chance.
On December 1, 1941, IGHQ decided that the 8th of the month would be X-Day. Appropriate orders were transmitted to General Hisaichi Terauchi, commanding the Southern Army; to General Shunroku Hata, commanding the China Expeditionary Army; and to Lieutenant General Tomitaro Horii, commanding the South Seas Detachment. These generals were to commence operations on December 8.
In determining X-Day,IGHQ took the following factors into consideration:
1.After March 1942, the entire balance of naval power between Japan and the United States would veer in favor of the latter.
IGHQ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, MID-1941
Hong Philip-
Forces Malaya Burma Borneo Kong pines Guam N.E.I. Total Ground Troops 80,000 35,000 3,500 19,000 163,000 1,800 70,000 372,000
(includes
some
200,000
regulars)
Aircraft 300 50 .. 10 160 .. 300 700 Warships East of the Indian Ocean:
2 aircraft carriers
4 seaplane tenders
4-6 battleships
39 cruisers
35 destroyers
50 submarines
SUPPLEMENTARY IGHQ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, MID-1941
Allied Forces India Australia New Zealand Troops 500,000 350,000 100,000 Aircraft 200 250 100
2.By the spring of 1942, the lion's share of the first-phase southern operations should be completed, it was hoped, for that would be the best time for the Japanese Army to carry out operations in the north [vs. the U.S.S.R.].(It was estimated that the first-phase operations would last about five months.)
3.Any postponement of X-Day would give the Allies time to step up their preparations for war against Japan.
4.During both January and February, weather conditions in Malaya would not be suitable for the projected landing operations.
5.Lunar tide conditions would be best for amphibious operations conducted about December 8.
The Southern Army was deployed as follows on the eve of the War:
Fourteenth Army: Advance units on Formosa and Palau. Main body on Formosa and Amami-Oshima [in the northern Ryukyus].
Fifteenth Army: Main part of Imperial Guard Division in South French Indo-China. (This division was scheduled to enter Thailand, under command of the Fifteenth Army.) Fifteenth Army Headquarters and the 55th Division were in French Indo-China; the 33d Division, in Central China.
Sixteenth Army: Sakaguchi Detachment on Palau; other elements principally in the Japanese homeland.
Twenty-fifth Army: Advance units on Hainan Island; other elements in South China.
- Kawaguchi Detachment: In South China.
- 3d Air Group(about 430 planes): In South French Indo-China.
- 5th Air Group (about 150 planes): On Formosa.
- GHQ, Southern Army: At Saigon.
Proper Operations:
ON DECEMBER 8, 1941 [0755 hours, December 7, Honolulu time], the Japanese Navy launched dawn air assaults upon Pearl Harbor and took the American forces by surprise. War in the Pacific was kindled, and the U. S. Pacific Fleet was very badly hurt. As a result, the first-phase southern operations of the Japanese Army could be executed without fear of the main American fleet.
The initial operations may be divided into three periods of activity. First objectives were Malaya and the Philippines-to destroy American and British bases in the Far East.
After the conclusion of diplomatic negotiations, the Fifteenth Army began to advance into Thailand on December 8. The occupation was completed on the very next day.
In the Malay region, it had been planned to carry out decisive air battles and amphibious landing operations simultaneously. The landings were to be pushed through determinedly, regardless of the outcome of the battles of annihilation in the air. On December 8, advance elements of the Twenty-Fifth Army, working closely with air units, made landings at Kota Bharu and Singora on the eastern shores of the Malayan Peninsula, as planned. Two days later the bulk of the Twenty-Fifth Army could land without qualms, since the naval air arm had knocked out the core of the British Far East Fleet in battles off the coast of Malaya. [H.M.S. REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES went down on December 10.]
After making their landings, the Japanese ground forces immediately commenced a swift drive upon Singapore. Ipoh fell on December 28; Kuantan, on the 31st. The momentum of the Japanese carried them on to Johore, which they took on January 31, 1942. Landings were made on Singapore Island on February 8.By the 15th the entire city had been seized, and about 100,000 British troops captured.
The concept of operations against the Philippines differed from that against Malaya. A deliberate assault was envisaged, involving decisive aerial battles, first of all; next, the seizure of air fields by advance elements; and, only then, landings by the main ground forces. The operations proceeded smoothly as planned: the air battles of annihilation waged by the Army and Navy air arms; the advance landings; the capture of airdromes; and the 5th Air Group's displacement to these air bases. Thereafter, the main Army forces landed at Lingayen Gulf on December 22, and at Lamon Bay on the 24th. Manila fell on January 2, 1942.
At the time, [Fourteenth] Army Headquarters paid but scant heed to
intelligence received after December 25, to the effect that the main American Army forces were moving from Manila toward Bataan and Corregidor. Such bungling led to the attack against Bataan after the capture of Manila. The Americans had set up defenses in the Bataan sector, taking skillful advantage of the jungle and the depth of their positions to prevent rapid pursuit by the Japanese.
The Fourteenth Army, reinforced by the 4th Division [IGHQ reserve] from Shanghai, and by other elements of infantry and artillery, launched a general offensive against the Bataan positions on April 3. The whole peninsula was taken by the 9th; Corregidor fell on May 7. Among the 53,000prisoners taken during the Philippines fighting, some 9,500 were American officersand men.
In the Hong Kong operations, the Twenty-third Army (built around the 38th Division) captured the city of Kowloon on December 12, 1941. Two days later, a general assault was mounted against Hong Kong, which fell on the 25th. About 11,000 British troops surrendered
The Kawaguchi Expeditionary Detachment, composed primarily of three infantry battalions under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, struck at [British] Borneo. Landings were made in the vicinity of Miri on December 16, and the oil-rich area was soon captured. The Japanese then shifted toward Kuching, which fell on the 25th; and toward Brunei, which they took on the 31st.
Against the eastern coast of Borneo next moved the Sakaguchi Detachment, commanded by Major General Shizuo Sakaguchi and built around three infantry battalions. On January 11, 1942, this detachment seized Takan Island and, on the 24th, Balikpapan. Other elements of the Sixteenth Army took Ambon Island on January 31, Makassar (in the Celebes) and Banjermasin (in South Borneo) on February 9.
With the unleashing of the Java and the South Burma operations, the war moved into its second stage. In view of Java's oil riches, the capture of this island, in particular, had been a primary objective of the southern operations and had been very carefully planned by IGHQ. Toward the end of December 1941, however, the date for launching the Java operation was advanced about one month by IGHQ, upon the advice of the Southern Army Commander, General Terauchi.
According to the plan of operations, landings were to be made on Java from east and west simultaneously, and the island captured after aerial supremacy had been wrested from the Dutch Air Force in the East Indies. To achieve this end, Japanese air strength was to push down into southern Sumatra and consolidate there just after the conclusion of the Malaya operations. Other air bases were to be successively deployed from both Borneo and the Celebes. The ground forces were to consist of the Sixteenth Army reinforced by the 38th and 48th Divisions.
Mastery of the air had already been won by the Japanese. On February 14, paratroop units seized an airhead at Palembang in southern Sumatra. The 38th Division followed this up and captured Palembang on the 17 Meanwhile, the Japanese Navy wasdefeating the remaining Allied squadrons off Java, Bali and Soerabaja, thus clearing the way for safely moving the Sixteenth Army to Java.
On March 1, the Japanese fleet destroyed the last American naval force off the coast of Batavia. On the same day, troops of the Sixteenth Army made landings near the northwesternmost cape of Java; at Patrol, east of Batavia; and at Kragan, northwest of Soerabaja. Batavia fell on the 5th; Soerabaja, on the 7th. The surrender of the Dutch East Indies forces (about 93,000 troops) on March 9 brought the operations to a pause, for the time being. Some 5,000 Americans, and Australians were also captured.
With a view toward cutting off the Aid-to-Chiang route, IGHQ strongly desired to seize possession of Burma without delay. The absence of reserve forces nevertheless necessitated a delay until the conclusion of the other operations. As the outcome of the Malaya offensive took shape, IGHQ-on January 22, 1942-ordered General Terauchi, the Commander of the Southern Arm, to capture strategic areas of Burma, in concert with the Navy. IGHQ, however, had no definitive idea where to end the Burma operation. The Fifteenth Army (with the 33d and 55th Divisions as its core) was to conduct the offensive in Burma, but consideration was being given to the reinforcement of that Army by the 56th Division if necessary.
After the consolidation of air bases in southern Burma, the war entered into its third phase. The Fifteenth Army, in charge of the Burma operations, defeated the bulk of the British and Indian forces near Rangoon on March 7, 1942, and occupied the city on the following day. There after the Army waged a number of battles in Central Burma. On May 13, most of the 20,000-strong British and Indian field forces were annihilated in the vicinity of Kalewa [on the Chindwin River, along the road to Imphal]. This action brought operations to an end for a while.
Meanwhile, in the Pacific area, the South Seas Detachment occupied the island of Guam on December 11, 1941, while naval forces took Wake on the 23d of the same month. The South Seas Detachment and naval landing parties came ashore in the Bismarcks on January 23, 1942, while the Eastern Detachment landed in Timor on February 20. The last-named unit consisted of three infantry battalions under the command of Major General Takeo Ito.
Thus, as the Army High Command had expected, the various stages of the Southern Army's first-phase operations were successfully brought to a close by mid-May 1942.
The primary keys to the success of the initial-phase operations lay in the achievement of both naval and aerial mastery, whereby three essential conditions were fulfilled: (1) Prevention of loss of transport vessels; (2) safety of landing operations; and (3) destruction of Allied ground forces.Within this context, the most important factor which contributed
to the success of the initial operations may have been the Navy's attack upon Pearl Harbor and subsequent control of the seas. Moreover, retention of air supremacy during all stages of the first phase, and close co-operation between naval and military forces, were other major elements in the early successes. Support by the air force did much to insure supremacy at sea.
To these factors must be added the method of initiating hostilities, which struck the Allies at their weak point. As for the coastal landings, victory was inevitable, for the Army was able to concentrate its great power an here desired against the impotent Allied ground forces. Nor was the United States Army yet ready to dispatch emergency forces overseas from the homeland; the Japanese could therefore easily devote themselves to crushing the hard-pressed foe. Since the Allies did not possess large, well-trained armies in the Far East, no decisive encounters occurred during the first-phase operations; but the powerful bulk of the Allied ground forces would be taking the offensive in the near future. From this point of view, success in the initial operational phases of the war was lacking in long-range, decisive elements of victory.
Inmediatelly after the fall of Singapore, the view mounted within certain Army circles that now was the best time for Japan to exploit her advantage and seek peace with Great Britain. The heart of this reasoning was the fact that Japan could not knock out both the United States and England, judging from such factors as national strength and geographical location. Besides, the Soviet Army had recovered from its setbacks in the war with Germany and had invincibly regained its feet now that winter (the Russians' most critical season) was over. Under the circumstances, Japan should plan to conclude a so-called compromise peace, seizing the opportunity after attainment of her war objectives. This sentiment was held by very few people, however, and most of the military paid scant attention to it.
Another opinion was burgeoning forth, moreover, among the public as a whole, to the effect that Japan should assist Germany in concentrating upon the war effort against Great Britain, thus hastening the latter's capitulation after her loss of Singapore. Japan's role: to mediate a separate peace between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Great things were also expected of the diplomatic abilities of Sato, newly appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union in February.The High Command, however, still held great hopes for the forthcoming summer offensive by the German Army, still dreamed of an opportunity for settling the northern problem, and did not listen to proposals for mediating a separate peace between Germany and Russia.
On March 7, 1942, an IGHQ-Government Liaison Conference decided upon a general outline of policy for subsequent direction of the war. The basic aims of the program follow.
1.In order to bring about Great Britain's surrender and America's loss of will, Japan should continue to enlarge the scope of the war gains already achieved, and endeavor to establish an invincible structure for protracted warfare, from the standpoint of both politics and combat.
2.Japan should seek to effect a self-sufficient basis, strengthening the war potential by exploiting, developing, and utilizing vital national resources.
Within the Army, there were certain objections to the preceding principles. Insistence was strong that Japan should not, during the second-phase operations, enlarge still further the areas already secured.
Japanese Army strategy
Victories in China in the Second Sino-Japanese war saw smaller Japanese armies routing their Chinese counterparts. Chinese soldiers, however, were often poorly trained, and lacked a modern air force and navy. In skirmishes with the Soviet Union in 1949, the Japanese were crushed by superior Soviet armour and artillery.
In the early stages of the war against the United States, the Japanese scored early when facing off against poorly-equipped outposts. Later they fared poorly later in against superior numbers and technology.
Japanese naval strategy
During the 1930s, Japanese Army and Navy leaders were involved in a debate over funds and strategy. The Army argued that it needed more men and equipment to defend against Soviet Russia. The navy argued for the "South Seas" operation in which Indochina, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies would be brought into the Japanese sphere of influence.
The Japanese government endorsed both strategies, putting a severe strain on the armed forces. The Navy believed that a large naval battle would be the key to success, as it had been in 1905 at the Battle of Tsushima. Early naval plans had the Army occupying Guam and the Philippines, then luring the United States Navy into a decisive battle. Although that plan was abandoned, the idea of a grand naval battle influenced the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Midway.
