Alasdair MacIntyre

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Alasdair MacIntyre is a philosopher known most for his contributions to moral philosophy. He is currently a Senior Research Professor of Philosophy at The University of Notre Dame, Indiana. Academic philosophers, students and non-academic observers, who have made MacIntyre one of the most widely read contemporary philosophers, absorb his work primarily because he excels at presenting complicated and historically controversial philosophical challenges in simple to understand narratives where adversaries are compared by their philosophical assumptions, questions and intellectual histories. Whereas many contemporary philosphers advance philosophical positions by focusing on the logical, analytical or so called scientific underpinnings, MacIntyre often appeals to the plain light of ordinary story telling (through insightful historical reconstruction) to resolve complicated issues in the areas of moral philosophy,intellectual history,ethics, practical reason, Aristotle, Collingwood and Thomas Aquinas. It's fair to say MacIntyre is one of many thinkers whose work benefited greatly from the influence of the study of historical thinking on the practice of philosophy in the Western Tradition. Croce, Hegel, Collingwood and others should be credited for contributing to this phenomenon.

More specifically, MacIntyre is a key figure in the recent surge of interest in virtue ethics, which identifies the central question of morality as having to do with how one should live one's life. This is an approach to philosophy that can accurately be compared to other moral systems by scope. MacIntyre and his supporters (both influencers and advocates) focus on moral problems as those having to do with how to make the most of an entire human life whereas most non-MacIntyre-ites focus on more granular, sharply focused ethical debates such as abortion, homosexual political rights, etc. MacIntyre is not silent on such matters, however, he does approach them from a wider context and less rule based standard.

This is an approach to moral philosophy that demonstrates that good judgement of individuals emanates from the development of good character. The underlying standards upon which good and evil are judged are grasphed through what a virtuous person decides, says or does. This is an Aristolian concept which is similar to the idea of an experienced or educated perceiver such as a wine connoisseur. It's impractical to say that wine X is the best wine on earth but there is wisdom in saying that person W is well known and widely respected for his/her views on wine and if he/she says wines 1, 2, and 3 are fantastic, chances are great that they are. This is a simplistic example to highlight only that judgements of virtuous persons in determining what is good or evil, right or wrong play a more central role than rules which are advanced to do the same.

Macintyre emphasises the importance of moral goods defined in respect to the virtuous person (this is what MacIntyre calls internal goods) rather than focusing on character-external phenomena such as the obligation of a moral agent (deontological ethics) or on the consequences of a particular moral act (utilitarianism). Virtue ethics in European/American academia is associated with pre-modern philosophers, especially philosophers before Immanuel Kant, although obviously a line of virtue ethicists can be traced back to the earliest episodes of human history. Macintyre has argued that certain ancient and medieval approaches to moral thought have been more insightful than modern ones, a view also advocated in various ways by such philosophers as Simon Blackburn, Bernard Williams, and Martha Nussbaum.

Selected works

• Marxism: An Interpretation, 1953;
• A Short History of Ethics, 1966;
• Marxism and Christianity, 1968;
• Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, 1971;

• After Virtue, 1981, 2nd ed. 1984;

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In After Virtue, MacIntyre traces the abandonment of Aristotelianism by René Descartes and his followers, through the Enlightenment to the philosophy of emotivism. What he concludes in part is that conceptions of morality depend upon conceptions of rationality which vary from people to people, time to time, situation to situation. What makes moral conclusions firm is their home in a tradition of thought defined not simply by a continuous supporting history but an active living and evolving culture.

• Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 1988;
• Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 1990;
• Dependent Rational Animals, 1999.