Battle of Dien Bien Phu
From Freepedia
| Battle of Dien Bien Phu | |
|---|---|
| Image:Indochina War, Wounded French Soldier, 1954.jpg Treating a wounded French soldier at Dien Bien Phu, April 1954. | |
| Conflict: First Indochina War | |
| Date: March 13-May 7 1954 | |
| Place: Vicinity of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam | |
| Outcome: Decisive Vietnamese victory | |
| Combatants | |
| France | Vietnam |
| Commanders | |
| Christian de Castries | Vo Nguyen Giap |
| Strength | |
| As of March 13: 10,800 (Davidson, 224) | As of March 13: 49,000 combat personel, 15,000 logistical support personel (Davidson, 223) |
| Casualties | |
| 2,293 dead 5,193 wounded 11,800 captured | 7,900 dead 15,000 wounded |
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (Chiến dịch Điện Biên Phủ) was the final battle in the First Indochina War between France and the Viet Minh. It occured between March and May, 1954, and ended in a massive French defeat that effectively ended the war.
The result of a series of blunders in the French decision making process was that the French undertook to create an air-supplied base, at Dien Bien Phu, deep in the hills of Vietnam. The purpose was to cut off Viet Minh supply lines into Laos. Instead, the Viet Minh, under general Vo Nguyen Giap, were able to surround and besiege the French. Tenacious fighting on the ground ensued. The Viet Mihn occupied the highlands around Dien Bein Phu, and were able to fire down accurately onto French positions. The French repeatedly repulsed Viet Minh assaults on their positions, occasionally air-dropping reinforcements in. Ultimately, however, the Viet Mihn were able to overrun the base and force the French to surrender.
Following the battle, the war ended with the 1954 Geneva accords. The accords partitioned Vietnam into a Communist north and democratic South; however, the interbellum peace that followed was short lived. Fighting resumed with in 1957 with the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War).
Contents |
Background and Lead-up to the Battle
By 1953, the First Indochina War was not going well for the French. A succession of commanders (Thierry d'Argenlieu, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and Raoul Salan) had proven incapable of suppressing the Viet Minh insurrection.
During their 1952-1953 campaign the Viet Minh had overrun vast swaths of the French colony of Laos, Vietnam's western neighbor. The French proved incapable of slowing down the Viet Minh, who fell back only after outrunning their always-tenuous supply lines.
In 1953, the French had begun to strengthen their defenses in the Hanoi delta region and to prepare for a series of offenses against Viet Minh staging areas in northwest Vietnam. They had set up a number of fortified towns and outposts in the area, including Lai-Chau near the Chinese border to the north, Na Sanh to the west of Hanoi, and Luang-Prabang and Plaine des Jarres in northern Laos.
That spring, General Vo Nguyen Giap of the Viet Minh launched a major offensive against Nan Sanh. After several days of fierce fighting, the Viet Minh were broken, leaving 1,544 casualties at the base and another 1,932 walking wounded. Vo withdrew most of his forces. In May 1953, French Premier Rene Mayer appointed Henri Navarre, a colleague whom he trusted, to take command of French Forces in Indochina. Mayer had given Navarre a single order - to create military conditions that would lead to an 'honorable political solution'. (Davidson, 165)
On arrival, Navarre was shocked by what he found. "There had been no long-range plan since de Lattre's departure. Everything was conducted on a day-to-day, reactive basis. Combat operations were undertaken only in response to enemy moves or threats. There was no comprehensive plan to develop the organization and build up the equipment of the Expeditionary force. Finally, Navarre, the intellectual, the cold and professional soldier, was shocked by the 'school's out' attitude of Salan and his senior commanders and staff officers. They were going home, not as victors or heroes, but then, not as clear losers either. To them the important thing was that they were getting out of Indochina with their reputations frayed, but intact. They gave little thought to, or concern for, the problems of their successors." (Davidson, 165)
One issue plagued Navarre - did his mission as High Commissioner of Vietnam require him to defend the colony of Laos as well? This would prove to be the most controversial issue surrounding the battle. Laos was far from the French seat of military power in Hanoi. Although Navarre assumed it was his responsibility, defending it would require taking on the grave risk of operating his army at great distance from its home. Navarre had a series of meetings with France's National Defense Committee in July 1953. During the July 17, Navarre asked for clarification regarding his responsibilities in Vietnam, about whether or not he was responsible for defending northern Laos. On July 24, Navarre met again with the Committee. This meeting produced a great misunderstanding, the most disputed fact of the controversy surrounding the battle. For years afterward, Navarre insisted the committee had reached no consensus; French Premier Joseph Laniel insisted that at that meeting, the Committee had instructed Navarre to abandon Laos if necessary. "On this key issue, the evidence supports Navarre's claim that on 24 July, he was given no clear-cut decision regarding his responsibility for Laos. Over the years, when challenged by Navarre, Laniel has never been able to present any written evidence to support his contention that Navarre was instructed to abandon Laos if necessary" (Davidson, 176). In hindsight, the reason for the committee's indecision is obvious. The committee's proceedings leaked to the press constantly. The politicians on the committee were not willing to make a clear statement on a policy decision that would be politically damaging.
Simultaneously, Navarre had been searching for a way to stop the Viet Minh threat to Laos. Colonel Louis Berteil, commander of Mobile Group 7, formulated one, the "herisson" (hedge hog) concept. The French army would establish a fortified airhead (a bridgehead created by air-lifting troops) adjacent to a key Viet Mihn supply line to Laos (Davidson, 173). This would effectively cut off Viet Mihn soldiers fighting in Laos, and force them to withdraw.
In June, Major general René Cogny, commander of the Tonkin Delta, had proposed Dien Bein Phu as a "mooring point". In another misunderstanding, Cogny had envisioned a lightly defended point from which to launch raids, however, to Navarre, this meant a heavily fortified base capable of withstanding a seige. Navarre selected Dien Bien Phu for the location of Bertiel's "hedge hog". When presented with it, every major subordinate officer protested - Colonel Jean Nicot, (commander of the French Air transport fleet), Cogny, and generals Gilles and Dechaux (the ground and air commanders for CASTOR, the initial airborn assult on Dien Bien Phu). Navarre rejected the criticisms of his proposal, and concluded a November 17 conference by declaring the operation would commence three days later, on November 20, 1953. (Davidson, 184)
Navarre decided to go ahead with the operation, despite the obvious operational difficulties, because he had been repeatedly assured by his intelligence officers that the operation had very little risk of involvement by a strong enemy force. (Davidson, 189) Navarre had previously considered three other ways to defend Laos: Mobile warfare, which was impossible given the terrain in Vietnam; a linear defense line stretching to Laos, which was impossibile given the number of troops at Navarre's disposal; or placing troops in the Laotian capitals and supplying them by air, which was made impossible by the distance from Hanoi to Phrabang and Vientiane (Davidson, 186). Thus, the only option left to Navarre was the hedge hog option, which he characterized as "a mediocre solution". (Davidson, 187)
In a sad twist of fate, the French National Defense Committee ultimately did agree that Navarre's responsiblity did not include defending Laos. However, their decision (which was drawn up on November 13) was not delivered to him until December 4, two weeks after the the Battle of Dien Bien Phu began. (Davidson, 176)
Operation Castor and the Establishment of the Airhead
Operations at Dien Bien Phu began at 10:35 on the morning of November 20, 1953. In Operation Castor, the French dropped or flew 9,000 troops into the area over three days. They were landed at three drop zones - Natasha (northwest of Dien Bien Phu), Octavie (southwest of Dien Bien Phu), and Simone (Southeast of Dien Bien Phu).
The Viet Minh elite 148th Independent Infantry Regiment, headquartered at Dien Bien Phu, reacted "instantly and effectively", however, three of their four battalions were absent that day (Davidson, 193). Initial operations proceeded well for the French. By the end of November, six parachute batallions had been landed and the French were consolidating their positions.
It was at this time that Giap began his counter-moves. Giap had expected an attack, but could not forsee when or where it would occur. Giap realized that if pressed, the French would abandon Lai Chau Province and fight a pitched battle at Dien Bein Phu. On November 24, Giap ordered the 148th Infantry Regiment and the 316th division to attack into Lai Chau, and the 308th, 312th, and 351st divisions to attack from Viet Bac into Dien Bien Phu (Davidson, 196).
Starting in December, the French, under the command of Colonel Christian de Castries, started transforming their anchoring point into a fortress by setting up various strongpoints, each one named after a former de Castries mistress. The center of the fortress had the headquarters with strongpoints "Huguette" to the west, "Claudine" to the south, and "Dominique" to the northeast. Other strongpoints were "Anne-Marie" to the northwest, "Beatrice" to the northeast, "Gabrielle" to the north and "Isabelle" four miles to the south, covering the reserve airstrip. The choice of Castries as the on-seen commander at Dien Bien Phu was, in retrospect, a bad one. Navarre had picked Castries, a cavalryman in the 18th century tradition, because Navarre envisioned Dien Bein Phu as a mobile battle. In reality, Dien Bien Phu required someone adept at First World War-style static defense, something for which Castries was not suited.
The arrival of the 316th division prompted Cogny to order the evacuation of the Lai Chau garrison to Dien Bein Phu, exactly as Giap had anticipated. En route, they were virtually annihilated by the Viet Minh. "Of the 2,100 men who left Lai Chau on December 9, only 185 made it to Dien Bein Phu on December 22. The rest had been killed or captured or deserted" (Davidson, 203). The Viet Minh troops now converged on Dien Bien Phu.
The French had committed 10,800 troops, with more reinforcements totaling nearly 16,000 men, to the defense of a monsoon-affected valley surrounded by heavily wooded hills that had not been secured. Artillery, as well as ten M-24 light tanks and numerous aircraft were committed to the garrison as well.
All told, the Viet Minh had moved 50,000 regular troops along with 55,000 supply troops, porters and militia into the hills surrounding the valley, totaling five divisions including the 351st Heavy Division made up entirely of heavy artillery. Artillery and AA guns, which outnumbered the French artillery by four to one, were moved into camouflaged positions overlooking the valley. The French came under sporadic Viet Minh artillery fire for the first time on January 31, 1954 and patrols encountered the Viet Minh in all directions. The battle had been joined, and the French were now surrounded.
The Battle
Things changed in early March, 1954, when it became clear that an increasing number of Viet Minh (Vietnamese Allied) troops were moving into the area. The battle proper opened on March 13 when, much to the surprise of the French, the Viet Minh unleashed a massive artillery barrage. By the end of the first night 9,000 shells had fallen on the area, and the Beatrice and Gabrielle positions had both fallen, albeit at huge cost to the attackers of over 2,500 men. In a major logistical feat, the Viet Minh had dragged scores of artillery pieces up steeply forested hillsides that the French had written off as impassable. The French artillery commander, Colonel Piroth, distraught at his inability to bring counterfire on the well-camouflaged Viet Minh batteries, went into his dugout and killed himself with a hand grenade. He was buried there in great secrecy to prevent loss of morale among the French troops.
The French responded by parachuting in reinforcements, but they were fired on by anti-aircraft guns, another surprise on the part of the Viet Minh. Considering the vital need for air supply, this was a troubling development for the defenders of the base. The French also started using their ground attack aircraft against the artillery, but there were not enough to have any real effect, considering how well the guns were hidden.
Realizing the importance of the air supply, Giap switched from the costly massed attacks, which were starting to bring his men to a point of mutiny, to a steady encroachment, conducting a web of trenches and artillery bombardments. In addition, the Viet Minh started the process of digging long trenches towards the middle of the camp, covering their movements from direct fire, and allowing for a buildup and assault under cover. The first runway fell after a five-day advance from the 18th to the 23rd. The last aircraft landed on the 28th on the second runway, but was destroyed in the process. The French responded with an offensive of their own on the 28th, attacking anti-aircraft positions. On the 31st the French recaptured two of the hilltop fortifications, Dominique and Eliane, but later had to evacuate them due to lack of reinforcements.
With resupply now entirely by parachute, supply flow started to dwindle. A good portion of the airdropped supplies landed in Viet Minh-controlled areas, giving them much needed matériel. The Vietnamese had essentially won the battle at this point, and they referred to the remainder of the battle as "slowly bleeding the dying elephant". During the last week of April the yearly monsoon arrived, further reducing the effectiveness of any air support that could be given. Trenches became hazards, and bunkers collapsed. The last replacements—4,306 soldiers under General Marcel Bigeard, parachuted in between March 14 and May 6—did not even make up for the losses suffered between those dates, 5,500. The French launched "Operation Condor" in April to relieve the garrison by sending a relief force from the Laotian capital to the valley. But the force became stalled in the featureless Laotian jungle and the garrison was isolated.
The French saw that defeat was imminent, but they sought to hold on till the Geneva peace meeting, which took place on April 26. The last French offensive took place on May 4, but it was ineffective. The Viet Minh then began to hammer the fort with newly acquired Russian rocket artillery. Giap mounted his final assault on May 1. From all sides the Viet Minh troops attacked the French positions and despite fierce resistance from French and Foreign Legion troops, Dominique, Eliane and Huguette were overrun over the next three days. By then, the French food rations were down to only five days and many of the troops were low on ammunition. Their hospital, short on medical supplies, was overcrowding with dead and wounded and the French morale was beginning to crack.
The final fall took two days, May 6th and 7th, during which the French fought on but were eventually overrun by a huge frontal assault. The final assault was on May 7, where after another massive Viet Minh artillery barrage, 25,000 of Giap's remaining men attacked the fewer than 3,000 French troops in the shrinking perimeter. The Viet Minh poured into the remaining French defenses and despite determined resistance from the French, the equally determined Viet Minh reached the French headquarters by 5:30 p.m. and De Castries surrendered. Although strongpoint Isabelle was to survive for another 24 hours, the siege of Dien Bien Phu was technically over.
At least 2,200 members of the 16,000-strong French forces died during the battle. Of the 50,000-100,000 or so Viet Minh involved, there were an estimate of nearly 8,000 killed and another 15,000 wounded.
After the battle
The 11,000 or more prisoners taken at Dien Bien Phu were the greatest number the Viet Minh had ever captured: one-third of the total captured during the entire war. The prisoners were divided into groups. The fit and walking wounded were force-marched over 250 miles to prison camps to the north and east. Hundreds died of disease on the way. The wounded, counted at 4,436, were given basic triage until the Red Cross arrived, removing 838 and giving better aid to the remainder. The remainder was then also sent into detention.
Prison camp was even worse. The French troops, many of them not even French, were constantly starved, beaten, and heaped with abuse. Many died. The Viet Minh used the presence of veteran World War II Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS soldiers serving under the Foreign Legion as propaganda against the French cause. About 3,300 malnourished, defeated prisoners were released in 1958.
Aftermath
The victory by the Viet Minh led to the 1954 Geneva accords, which partitioned Vietnam into communist North Vietnamese and French South Vietnamese administered zones. This partition was supposed to be temporary, and the two zones were supposed to be reunited by national elections in 1956. After the French withdrawal, the U.S. supported the southern government under Emperor Bao Dai as chief of state and his Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, which opposed the agreement, arguing that Ho Chi Minh from the North had been killing Northern patriots and terrorising people both in the North and the South. This dispute would eventually escalate into the Second Indochina War.
References
- Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War. Oxford University Press, New York. ISBN 0195067924
