Internalism and externalism
From Freepedia
Recently internalism and externalism have become part of the standard jargon of philosophical discourse, and have become central to certain important debates.
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Moral philosophy
In contemporary moral philosophy, internalism is the view that moral beliefs function as a motivating factor. That is, the internalist believes that there is an internal connection between her belief that "X ought to be done" and her motivation to do X. In the same way, an externalist would argue that there is no essential internal connection between moral beliefs and motives, i.e. there's no essential reason that the belief "X is wrong" leads to a desire not to do X. It is likely that this use of these terms comes from W.D. Falk's paper Ought and motivation (1948).
Epistemology
In contemporary epistemology internalism about justification is the idea that everything necessary to provide justification for a belief is immediately available in consciousness. Externalism in this context is the view that there are factors other than those which are internal to the believer which can affect the justificatory status of a belief. One strand of externalism is loosely called the causal theory of knowledge, and reliabilism is sometimes considered to be another strand. It is important to distinguish internalism about justification from internalism about knowledge. An internalist about knowledge will likely hold that the conditions that distinguish mere true belief from knowledge are similarly internal to the individual's perspective or grounded in the subject's mental states. Whereas internalism about justification is a widely endorsed view, there are few defenders of internalism about knowledge thanks in no small part to Gettier and Gettier-like examples (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem) that suggest that there is more to knowledge than just justified true belief. In a short but widely discussed paper published in 1963, Gettier produced examples that seemed to show that owing to an accidental connection between an individual's evidence or reasons and the truth of her belief, someone could be justified in believing something true but nevertheless be ignorant.
One line of argument in favor of externalism begins with the observation that if what justified our beliefs failed to significantly eliminate the risk of error, then it does not seem that knowledge would be attainable as it would appear that when our beliefs did happen to be correct, this would really be a matter of good fortune. While many will agree with this last claim, the argument seems inconclusive. Setting aside sceptical concerns about the possession of knowledge, Gettier cases have suggested the need to distinguish justification from warrant where warrant is understood as that which distinguishes justified true belief from knowledge by eliminating the kind of accidentality often present in Gettier-type cases. Even if something must significantly reduce the risk of error, it is not clear why justification is what must fill the bill.
One of the more popular arguments from internalism begins with the observation, perhaps first due to Stewart Cohen, that when we imagine subjects completely cut off from their surroundings (thanks to a malicious Cartesian demon, perhaps) we do not think that in cutting these individuals off from their surroundings, these subjects cease to be rational in taking things to be as they appear. The 'new evil demon' argument for internalism (and against externalism) begins with the observation that individuals like us on the inside will be as justified as we are in believing what we believe. As it is part of the story that these individual's beliefs are not produced by reliable mechanisms or backed by veridical perceptual experiences, the claim that the justification of our beliefs depends upon such things appears to be seriously challenged. Externalists have offered a variety of responses but none appear to have won the hearts and minds of the epistemological community.
External link: Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification
Semantics
Semantic externalism comes in two flavours, depending on whether meaning is construed cognitively or linguistically. On a cognitive construal, externalism is the thesis that what concepts (or contents) are available to a thinker is determined by her environment, or her relation to her environment. On a linguistic construal, externalism is the thesis that the meaning of a word is environmentally determined. Likewise, one can construe semantic internalism in two ways, as a denial of either of these two theses.
See also:
- Linguistic turn and cognitive turn for more about the two construals of meaning.
- Twin Earth thought experiment
Philosophy of mind
Within the context of the philosophy of mind, externalism is the theory that mental states are dependent on their relationship to the external world. This is in contrast to both a Cartesian dualism which posits two separable realms for thought and extension (or to use more modern terms, mind and matter), as well as George Berkeley's radical idealism. Externalists generally claim that thoughts or other mental states are caused by external forces, but also that thought, feelings, and all of the other mental states could not exist if except as part of a larger world external to thought. Internalism in this context is precisely the opposite. They would claim that there is nothing essential to the concept of a mental state which requires the existence of an external world.
