New World Order (political)

From Freepedia

The term New World Order has been used several times in recent history, referring to what appeared to be a dramatic change in world political thought and the balance of power.

Contents 1 Historical usage 2 The Post-Cold War "New World Order" 2.1 Gorbachev's formulation 2.2 The Malta Summit 2.3 The Gulf War and Bush's formulation 2.3.1 A vision of unipolarity 2.3.2 The past is prologue 2.4 Viewed in retrospect 3 Related topics 3.1 International economics 3.2 World government 3.3 U.S. one dollar bill 4 Reference notes

Historical usage

The phrase "New World Order" was first widely used by Woodrow Wilson in the period just after World War I, during the formation of the League of Nations. The "war to end all wars" had been a powerful catalyst in international politics, and many felt the world could simply no longer operate as it once had. The term fell from use when it became clear the League was creating nothing of the sort, and was used very little during the formation of the United Nations. (Although some have claimed the phrase was not used at all, Virginia Gildersleeve, the sole female delegate to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945, did use it in an interview with the New York Times.)

The phrase was used by some in retrospect when assessing the creation of the post-World War II set of international institutions. The United Nations, the U.S. security alliances such as NATO, along with the Bretton Woods system of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were seen as de facto creating a new world order. Regarding foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan characterized this new order.

The Post-Cold War "New World Order"

The phrase "new world order" did not ever have a developed or substantive definition. There appear to be three distinct periods in which it was progressively redefined, first by the Soviets, and later by the U.S.—pre-Malta, post-Malta, and post-11 September 1990. It seems that the new world order concept was secondary at best to the Bush administration, and at worst a rhetorical tool that implied more than it meant. Throughout the period of the phrase’s use, the public seemed to expect much more from the phrase than any politicians did, and predictions about the new order quickly outraced the rather lukewarm descriptions made in official speeches.

1. At first, the new world order dealt almost exclusively with disarmament and security arrangements. Gorbachev would then expand the phrase to include UN strengthening, and great power cooperation on a range of North-South, economic, and security problems. Implications for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and European integration were subsequently included.
2. The Malta Summit collected these various expectations, and they were fleshed out in more detail by the press. German reunification, human rights, and the polarity of the international system were then included.
3. The Gulf War crisis refocused the term on superpower cooperation and regional crises. Economics, North-South problems, the integration of the Soviets into the international system, and the changes in economic and military polarity received greater attention.

Gorbachev's formulation

The first press reference to the phrase came from Russo-Indian talks, 21 November 1988. PM Rajiv Gandhi uses the term in reference to the commitments made by the USSR through the Delhi Declaration of two years previous. The new world order which he describes is characterized by "non-violence and the principles of peaceful coexistence." He also includes the possibility of a sustained peace, an alternative to the nuclear balance of terror, dismantling of nuclear weapons systems, significant cuts in strategic arms, and eventually a general and complete disarmament.^[1]

Three days later, a Guardian article quotes NATO Secretary General Woerner as saying that the Soviets have come close to accepting NATO’s doctrine of military stability based on a mix of nuclear as well as conventional arms. This, in his opinion, would spur the creation of "a new security framework" and a move towards "a new world order."^[2]

But the principal statement creating the new world order concept came from Gorbachev’s 7 December 1988 speech to the United Nations. His formulation included a laundry list of ideas in creating a new order:

• Strengthening the central role of the United Nations, and the active involvement of all members. Reinvigoration of the peacekeeping role is especially key.
• A phenomenon that could be described as a global political awakening:

Image:Cquote1.png

We are witnessing most profound social change. Whether in the East or the South, the West or the North, hundreds of millions of people, new nations and states, new public movements and ideologies have moved to the forefront of history. Broad-based and frequently turbulent popular movements have given expression, in a multidimensional and contradictory way, to a longing for independence, democracy and social justice. The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a powerful socio-political force. At the same time, the scientific and technological revolution has turned many economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population problems, which only recently we treated as national or regional ones, into global problems. Thanks to the advances in mass media and means of transportation, the world seems to have become more visible and tangible. International communication has become easier than ever before.

Image:Cquote2.png

• There is only one world economy—essentially an end to economic blocs.
• The use of force or the threat of the use of force is no longer legitimate, and that the strong must demonstrate restraint toward the weak.
• The de-ideologizing of relations among states.
• The major powers of the world will principally be: the United States, Europe, India, China, Japan, and Brazil.
• Cooperation on environmental protection.
• Debt relief for developing countries.
• Recognition that superpower cooperation can and will lead to the resolution of regional conflicts.
• Soviet inclusion in the CSCE and ICJ, as well as an end to the jamming of Radio Liberty.
• Disarmament of nuclear weapons, significant withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and Asia. Preservation of the ABM treaty, and a convention of the elimination of chemical weapons.

In the press, Gorbachev was compared to Woodrow Wilson giving the Fourteen Points, to FDR and Churchill promulgating the Atlantic Charter, and to Marshall and Truman building the Western Alliance. His speech, while visionary, was to be approached with caution. He was seen as attempting a fundamental redefinition of international relationships, on economic and environmental levels. His support "for independence, democracy and social justice" was highlighted. But the principle message taken from his speech was that of a new world order based on pluralism, tolerance, and cooperation.^[3]

Image:Cquote1.png

For a new type of progress throughout the world to become a reality, everyone must change. Tolerance is the alpha and omega of a new world order. —President Gorbachev, June 1990

Image:Cquote2.png

A month later, Time Magazine ran a longer analysis of the speech and its possible implications. The promises of a new world order based on the forswearing of military use of force was viewed partially as a threat, which might "lure the West toward complacency" and "woo Western Europe into neutered neutralism." The more overriding threat, however, was that the West did not yet have any imaginative response to Gorbachev—leaving the Soviets with the moral initiative, and solidifying Gorbachev’s place as "the most popular world leader in much of Western Europe." The article noted as important his de-ideologized stance, willingness to give up use of force, commitment to troop cuts in Eastern Europe (accelerating political change there), and compliance with the ABM treaty. The new world order seemed to imply:

• Shifting of resources from military to domestic needs
• A world community of states based on the rule of law
• A dwindling of security alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact
• An inevitable move toward European integration

The author felt that Bush should counter Gorbachev’s "common home" rhetoric toward the Europeans with the idea of "common ideals," turning an alliance of necessity into one of shared values. Gorbachev’s repudiation of expansionism leaves America in a good position, no longer having to support anti-communist dictators, and able to pursue better goals: the environment, proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, reducing famine and poverty, and resolving regional conflicts.^[4]

In A World Transformed, Bush and Scowcroft’s concern about losing leadership to Gorbachev is noted, and they worry that the Europeans might stop following the U.S. if it appears to drag its feet.^[5]

As Europe passed into the new year, the implications of the new world order for the Community surfaced. The European Community was seen as the vehicle for integrating East and West in such a manner that they could "pool their resources and defend their specific interests in dealings with those superpowers on something more like equal terms." It would be less exclusively tied to the U.S., and stretch "from Brest to Brest-Litovsk, or at least from Dublin to Lublin."^[6]

By July 1989, newspapers were still criticizing Bush for his lack of response to Gorbachev’s proposals. Bush visited Europe but "left undefined for those on both sides of the Iron Curtain his vision for the new world order", leading commentators to view the U.S. as overly cautious and reactive, rather than pursuing long-range strategic goals.^[7]

The Malta Summit

In A World Transformed, Bush and Scowcroft craft a strategy of flooding Gorbachev with proposals at the Malta Summit in order to catch him off guard, preventing the U.S. from coming out of the summit on the defensive.^[8]

The Malta Summit of 2-3 December 1989 reinvigorated discussion of the new world order. Various new concepts arose in the press as elements on the new order:

• Replacing containment with superpower cooperation on reducing armaments and troops, settling regional disputes, stimulating economic growth, lessening East-West trade restrictions, inclusion of the Soviets in international economic institutions, and protecting the environment
• Principles of political liberty, self-determination, non-intervention
• A new role for NATO as a forum for negotiation and treaty verification, or perhaps a wholesale dissolving of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in light of the four-power framework from WWII’s resurrection (U.S., UK, France, and Russia).
• Refraining from sponsoring military conflicts in third countries, restrictions on global arms sales
• Involvement in the Middle East (especially Syria, Palestine, and Israel)
• U.S. promotion of human rights in China and South Africa
• Debt relief, shift from East-West competition, to North-South cooperation
• German reunification was seen as part of the new order. However, Strobe Talbott saw it as more of a brake on the new era, and believed Malta to be a holding action on part of the superpowers designed to forestall the “new world order” because of the German question^[9]
• Continued U.S. military presence in Europe to help contain “historic antagonisms”, thus making possible a new European order
• Political change in Eastern Europe (The Eastern Europeans believed that the new world order didn’t signify superpower leadership, but that superpower dominance was coming to an end)^[10]
• Soviet social and economic crisis sharply limiting its ability to project power abroad
• Continuing expectation or even requirement of U.S. leadership
• Relative decline of the two superpowers compared to the rest of the world. Economic tripolarity in the near future: U.S., Germany, and Japan

President Bush was criticized for taking refuge behind notions of “status quo-plus” rather than a full out commitment to new world order. Others noted that Bush thus far failed to satisfy the out-of-control “soaring expectations” that Gorbachev’s speech unleashed.^[11]

The Gulf War and Bush's formulation

President Bush started to take the initiative from Gorbachev during the run-up to the Gulf War, when he began to define the elements of the new world order as he saw it, and link the new order’s success to the international community’s response in Kuwait.

Initial agreement by the Soviets to allow action against Saddam highlighted this linkage in the press. The Washington Post declared that this superpower cooperation demonstrates that the Soviet Union has joined the international community, and that in the new world order Saddam faces not just the U.S. but the international community itself.^[12] A New York Times editorial was the first to assert that at stake in the collective response to Saddam was "nothing less than the new world order which [Bush] and other leaders struggle to shape." ^[13]

In A World Transformed, Scowcroft notes that Bush even offered to have Soviet troops amongst the coalition forces liberating Kuwait. Bush places the fate of the new world order on the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to respond to Hussein’s aggression.^[14] The idea that the Gulf War would usher in the new world order began to take shape. Bush notes that the "premise [was] that the United States henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented degree, as demonstrated by the Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt to pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community."^[15]

A pivotal point came with President Bush’s 11 September 1990 "Toward a New World Order" speech to a joint session of Congress. This time it was Bush, not Gorbachev, whose idealism was compared to Woodrow Wilson, and to FDR at the creation of the UN. Key points picked up in the press were:

• Commitment to U.S. strength, such that it can lead the world toward rule of law, rather than use of force. The Gulf crisis was seen as a reminder that the U.S. must continue to lead, and that military strength does matter, but that the resulting new world order should make military force less important in the future.
• Soviet-American partnership in cooperation toward making the world safe for democracy, making possible the goals of the UN for the first time since its inception. Some countered that this was unlikely, and that ideological tensions would remain, such that the two superpowers could be partners of convenience for specific and limited goals only. The inability of the USSR to project force abroad was another factor in skepticism toward such a partnership.
• Another caveat raised was that the new world order was based not on U.S.-Soviet cooperation, but really on Bush-Gorbachev cooperation, and that the personal diplomacy made the entire concept exceedingly fragile.
• Future cleavages were to be economic not ideological, with the First and Second world cooperating to contain regional instability in the Third World. Russia could become an ally against economic assaults from Asia, Islamic terrorism, and drugs from Latin America.
• Soviet integration into world economic institutions, such at the G7, and establishment of ties with the European Community.
• Restoration of German sovereignty and Cambodia’s acceptance of the UN Security Council’s peace plan on the day previous to the speech were seen as signs of what to expect in the new world order
• The reemergence of Germany and Japan as members of the great powers, and concomitant reform of the UN Security Council was seen as necessary for great power cooperation and reinvigorated UN leadership
• Europe was seen as taking the lead on building their own world order, while the U.S. was relegated to the sidelines. The rationale for U.S. presence on the continent was vanishing, and the Gulf crisis was seen an incapable of rallying Europe. Instead Europe was discussing the European Community, the CSCE, and relations with the USSR. Gorbachev even proposed an all-European security council to replace the CSCE, in effect superseding the increasingly irrelevant NATO.
• A very few postulated a bi-polar new order of U.S. power and UN moral authority, the first as global policeman, the second as global judge and jury. The order would be collectivist, in which decisions and responsibility would be shared.

These were the common themes that emerged from reporting about Bush’s speech and its implications.^[16] Critics held that Bush and Baker remained too vague about what exactly the order entailed.

Image:Cquote1.png

Does it mean a strengthened U.N.? And new regional security arrangements in the gulf and elsewhere? Will the U.S. be willing to put its own military under international leadership? In the gulf, Mr. Bush has rejected a U.N. command outright. Sometimes, when Administration officials describe their goals, they say the U.S. must reduce its military burden and commitment. Other times, they appear determined to seek new arrangements in order to preserve U.S. military supremacy and to justify new expenditures.

Image:Cquote2.png

The American left called the new world order a "rationalization for imperial ambitions" in the Middle East. The right rejected new security arrangements altogether and fulminated about any possibility of UN revival.^[17] Pat Buchanan predicted that the Gulf War would in fact be the demise of the new world order, the concept of UN peacekeeping, and the U.S.'s role as global policeman.^[18]

Two other articles stood out, one discussing the Gulf crisis and polarity in the new world order, the other discussing U.S. efforts to mobilize the international community in support of the Gulf War and the new world order:

A vision of unipolarity

The LA Times reported that the speech signified more than just the rhetoric about superpower cooperation. In fact, the deeper reality of the new world order was the United States’ emergence "as the single greatest power in a multipolar world." Moscow was crippled by internal problems, and thus unable to project power abroad. The United States, while hampered by economic malaise, was militarily unconstrained for the first time since the end of WWII. Militarily, it was now a unipolar world, as illustrated by the Gulf crisis. While diplomatic rhetoric stressed a U.S.-Soviet partnership, the U.S. was deploying troops to Saudi Arabia, a mere 700 miles from the Soviet frontier, and was preparing for war against a former Soviet client state. Further, U.S. authority over the Soviets was displayed in 1) the unification of Germany, withdrawal of Soviet forces, and almost open appeal to Washington for aid in managing the Soviet transition to democracy, 2) withdrawal of Soviet support for Third World clients, and 3) Soviets seeking economic aid through membership in Western international economic and trade communities.^[19]

The past is prologue

The Economist published an article explaining the drive toward the Gulf War in terms presaging the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003. The author notes directly that despite the coalition, in the minds of most governments this is America's war, and Bush that "chose to stake his political life on defeating Mr Hussein." An attack on Iraq would certainly shatter Bush’s alliance, they assert, predicting calls from Security Council members saying that diplomacy should have been given more time, and that they will not wish to allow a course of action "that leaves America sitting too prettily as sole remaining superpower." When the unanimity of the Security Council ends, "all that lovely talk about the new world order" will too. And when casualties mount, "Bush will be called a warmonger, an imperialist and a bully." The article goes on to say that Bush and Baker’s speechifying cannot save the new world order once they launch a controversial war. It closes noting that a wide consensus is not necessary for U.S. action—only a hard core of supporters: Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab states, Egypt, and Britain. The rest need only not interfere.^[20]

In a passage with similar echoes of the future, Bush and Scowcroft explain in A World Transformed the role of the UN Secretary General in attempting to avert the Gulf War. UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar arrived at Camp David to ask what he could do to head off the war. Bush told him that it was important that we get full implementation on every UN resolution. "If we compromise, we weaken the UN and our own credibility in building this new world order," I said. "I think Saddam Hussein doesn’t believe force will be used—or if it is, he can produce a stalemate." Additional meetings between Baker or Javier and the Iraqis are rejected for fear that they will simply come back empty-handed once again. Bush fears that Javier will be cover for Hussein’s manipulations. Javier suggests another Security Council meeting, but Bush sees no reason for one.^[21]

Viewed in retrospect

A 2001 paper in Presidential Studies Quarterly examined the idea of the "new world order" as it was presented by the Bush administration (mostly ignoring previous uses by Gorbachev). Their conclusion was that Bush really only ever had three firm aspects to the new world order:

1. Checking the offensive use of force;
2. Promoting collective security; and,
3. Using great power cooperation.

These were not developed into a policy architecture, but came about incrementally as a function of domestic, personal, and global factors. Because of the somewhat overblown expectations for the new world order in the media, Bush was widely criticized for lacking vision.

The Gulf crisis is seen as the catalyst for Bush’s development and implementation of the new world order concept. They note that before the crisis, the concept remained "ambiguous, nascent, and unproven" and that the United States had not assumed a leadership role with respect to the new order. Essentially, the Cold War's end was the permissive cause for the new world order, but the Gulf crisis was the active cause.

They reveal that in August 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas W. Freeman, Jr. sent a cable to Washington from Saudi Arabia in which he argued that U.S. conduct in the Gulf crisis would determine the nature of the world. Bush would then refer to the "new world order" at least 42 times from the summer of 1990 to the end of March 1991. They also note that Secretary of Defense Cheney gave three priorities to the Senate on fighting the Gulf War:

1. Prevent further aggression;
2. Protect oil supplies;
3. Further a new world order.

The authors note that the new world order did not emerge in policy speeches until after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, maintaining that the concept was clearly not critical in the U.S. decision to deploy. John Sununu later indicated that the administration wanted to refrain from talking about the concept until Soviet collapse was more clear. A reversal of Soviet collapse would have been the death knell for the new order.

Bush and Scowcroft were frustrated by the exaggerated and distorted ideas surrounding the new world order. They did not intend to suggest that the U.S. would yield significant influence to the UN, or that they expected the world to enter an era of peace and tranquility. They preferred multilateralism, but did not reject unilateralism. The new world order did not signal peace, but a "challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay."

Bush’s drive toward the Gulf War was based on the world making a clear choice. Baker recalls that UNSCR 660’s "language was simply and crystal clear, purposely designed by us to frame the vote as being for or against aggression". Bush's motivation centered around 1) the dangers of appeasement, and 2) failure to check aggression could spark further aggression. Bush repeatedly invoked images of World War II in this connection, and became very emotional over Iraqi atrocities being committed in Kuwait. He also believed that failure to check Iraqi aggression would lead to more challenges to the U.S.-favored status quo and global stability. While the end of the Cold War increased U.S. security globally, it remained vulnerable to regional threats. Furthermore, Washington believed that addressing the Iraqi threat would help reassert U.S. predominance in light of growing concerns about relative decline, following the resurgence of Germany and Japan.

The Gulf War was also framed as a test case for UN credibility. As a model for dealing with aggressors, Scowcroft believed that the United States ought to act in a way that others can trust, and thus get UN support. It was critical that the U.S. not look like it was throwing its weight around. Great power cooperation and UN support would collapse if the U.S. marched on the Baghdad to try and remake Iraq. However, practically, superpower cooperation was limited. For example, when the U.S. deployed troops to Saudi Arabia, Shevardnadze became furious at not being consulted.

By 1992, the authors note, the U.S. was already abandoning the idea of collective action. The leaked draft of the (Wolfowitz-Libby) 1992 Defense Guidance Report effectively confirmed this shift, as it called for a unilateral role for the U.S. in world affairs, focusing on preserving American dominance.^[22]

In closing A World Transformed, Scowcroft sums up what his expectations were for the new world order. He states that the U.S. has the strength and the resources to pursue its own in interests, but has a disproportionate responsibility to use its power in pursuit of the common good, as well as an obligation to lead and to be involved. The U.S. is perceived as uncomfortable in exercising its power, and ought to work to create predictability and stability in international relations. America need not be embroiled in every conflict, but ought to aid in developing multilateral responses to them. The U.S. can unilaterally broker disputes, but ought to act whenever possible in concert with equally committed partners to deter major aggression.

Related topics

International economics

Two closely related terms, the "New International Economic Order" and the "New International Information Order," were popular in the United Nations and its specialized agencies (especially UNESCO) in the 1970s and 1980s. They were used mainly by developing country groups (e.g., the G-77, the Non-Aligned Movement) to refer to the redistribution of wealth on a global scale, and the international control of the media to stop the "defamation" of third world countries. Western countries attacked these plans as an attempt to destroy capitalism and freedom of speech; and they were quietly dropped in the 1980s after Western countries threatened to withdraw from United Nation's bodies. (The U.S. and UK made good on this threat by withdrawing from UNESCO; both have since rejoined.)

World government

Main articles: New World Order (conspiracy), World government

The term has developed pejorative meanings. Certain traditionally conservative American educational organizations such as the John Birch Society have long used the phrase to warn about the United Nations' emerging character as a world government. The left wing may prefer to use it to promote an image of the United States as a bully which no longer has to answer to anyone, and which uses the situation to extend its influence. Thus, extension of the NATO pact to regions in eastern Europe, the Kosovo War, the war in Iraq, and isolation of small "unbending" nations are all seen as examples of this bullying attitude. The elder Bush's use of the term "New World Order" was picked up as a convenient catchphrase to symbolize this attitude.

U.S. one dollar bill

There is misunderstanding that the Latin text on the back of the U.S. one dollar bill, "Novus Ordo Seclorum," means "New World Order." It actually is a quote from Virgil which means "New Order of the Ages." It was meant by the designer of the reverse side of the Great Seal, Charles Thompson, to describe the new American era.

See: The Great Seal - an explanation of the "Novus Ordo Seclorum" on the back of the dollar bill.

Reference notes

1. ^  "Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Hold Talks on 19th November Speeches Made at Peace Prize." 21 November 1988.
2. ^  "Soviets ‘in arms strategy shift’", The Guardian, 24 November 1988
3. ^  "Vision on the World Stage", Washington Post, 9 November 1988
4. ^  "The Gorbachev Challenge", Time Magazine, 19 December 1988
5. ^  George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed, ISBN 0679752595, pp42-43
6. ^  "The Dog that Failed to Bark", Financial Times, 10 January 1989
7. ^  "Still searching for the Bush Doctrine", Boston Globe, 23 July 1989
8. ^  A World Transformed, pp163-167
9. ^  "American Abroad; Braking the Juggernaut", Time Magazine, 18 December 1989
10. ^  "Soviet hopes are undaunted", Boston Globe, 3 December 1989
11. ^  List of new world expectations compiled from:
    • "U.S. must get involved in shaping a new world order", Boston Globe, 3 December 1989
    • "New World Order Galloping Into Position", Washington Post, 25 February 1990
    • "A Workmanlike Summit", New York Times, 5 June 1990
12. ^  "Summit Decision Signals Superpower Cooperation", Washington Post, 2 September 1990
13. ^  "The Month that Shook the World", New York Times, 2 September 1990
14. ^  A World Transformed, pp361-364
15. ^  A World Transformed, pp399-400
16. ^  List of new world expectations compiled from:
    • "Evoking the memory of Wilson and 'a new world order'", Boston Globe, 12 September 1990
    • "Superpowers to Superpartners", Newsweek, 17 September 1990
    • "Steps to a new world order", Financial Times, 17 September 1990
    • "U.S. leads the new world order", Toronto Star, 19 September 1990
    • "Europe choreographs new world order, but Bush is out of step", Boston Globe, 21 November 1990
17. ^  "George Bush Meet Woodrow Wilson", New York Times, 20 November 1990
18. ^  A World Transformed, pp426
19. ^  "With Moscow Crippled, U.S. Emerges as Top Power", LA Times, 12 September 1990
20. ^  "New World Order Inc", The Economist, 10 November 1990
21. ^  A World Transformed, pp440
22. ^  Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, "The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration’s Worldview in Transition." Presidential Studies Quarterly, March 2001
23. ^  A World Transformed, pp565-566